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Misrepresentation in Application for
Liability Insurance
Julien C. Renswick*
T HE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is discussion of the defenses
available to the insured when the insurer attempts for-
feiture of a liability policy, particularly auto accident liability,
for alleged misrepresentation at the time of application by the
insured.
Before directing our attention to the cases, some attention
should be given to the sales practices employed by agents in
selling liability insurance to customers, as knowledge of their
techniques of salesmanship is necessary to an understanding
of many decisions.
Insurance is sold to a consumer by an agent who may be
working for one or several carriers. The agent is generally held
to be in the service of the insurer rather than the consumer.
The insurer usually has the right to reject an applicant, and
makes this decision based upon information contained in a written
application form, furnished to the agent by the insurer, to be com-
pleted by the applicant.
The applicant almost never knows as much about liability
coverage as does the agent. The questions on the application, a
printed form prepared by the insurer, are frequently obscure,
if not incomprehensible. Therefore, even if the agent initially
turns the application forms over to the applicant to fill the
answers in himself, in answering the application the applicant
typically asks the agent for assistance.
Because the filling in of the application by the consumer
himself may be time consuming, may result in defaced application
forms, and may contain extraneous information, the agent not
infrequently decides to perform the mechanics of filling out the
answers himself, with information orally given to him by the
applicant, asking no more writing of the applicant than the
latter's signature. The applicant, respecting the superior know-
how of the agent, almost never protests this procedure.
There is often an additional reason why the agent supervises
the application process. Even though the agent, as the servant
of the carrier, wants to secure prudent desirable risks for the
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insurer, this agent is also interested, as a commission salesman,
in writing as many policyholders as he can. Accordingly, this
ambivalence, in a borderline case where he knows the insurer
may or may not accept the risk, is capable of causing the agent
to shade the responses of the applicant in a manner likely to
cause the carrier to accept rather than reject the risk, so as to
produce another commission for the agent. Where the agent
handles the application himself, this shading can be done either
as the result of how the questions are asked (if at all), and how
the answers are written.
This process of shading answers so as to invite acceptance
rather than the rejection of the applicant is further encouraged
by merchandising techniques of the large liability carrier's sell-
ing on a mass production basis, so that the agent no longer has
the ultimate knowledge of the insured and his family that would
militate against such techniques. The mass producing agent may
never see the insured again after the initial interview, and
frequently has no independent recollection of the interview.
This practice of agents, recognized by the West Virginia
Court in 1885 in Schwarzbach v. Ohio Valley Protective Union,'
is as prevalent now as it was then, applying to casualty as well
as to life insurance agents.
So that under this system adopted now, it is believed, by all
or nearly all life insurance companies, that agents to procure
application, have a direct pecuniary interest and generally
a large one to procure applications, on which the insurance
company will issue policies, and in order to do so, these
agents frequently take the preparations of such applications
into their own hands and procure the signature of the
insured who, trusting to the agent, has not read the applica-
tion.
So much for the discussion of the insurance business. Let
us now assume that there is a misrepresentation by the applicant
which causes the carrier to deny coverage. What, if any, rem-
edies are available to the insured or the injured to compel
coverage?
Construction of the Contract
Initially, the contract of insurance and the application should
be examined minutely to rule out the existence of any ambiguity
or obscurity which might explain away the incorrect answer.
1 25 W. Va. 622, 662 (1885).
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The general rule of construction, by which an insurance
policy is construed strongly against the insurer and favorably to
the insured, applies to the application and matters contained
therein as to the policy itself, inasmuch as the application is also
prepared by the insurer.2 Accordingly, there is an affirmative
duty on the part of the insurer to frame questions in the applica-
tion so that they will be free from misleading interpretations.
3
In support of this rule of construction a Maryland federal
district court held that a negative answer to a question in an
application for automobile casualty insurance, inquiring whether
any operator was mentally impaired because of eye, leg or arm
paralysis etc., was not misrepresentation though one of the
operators in the family had been affected previously with epi-
lepsy. 4 And a California court refused to permit an auto insurer
to cancel a policy for misrepresentation in the application where
the policyholder represented his occupation was that of rancher,
though he was also a part time fireman and was on his way to
answer a call in his line of duty as a fireman when the loss
occurred.5
But let us assume that the claimed misrepresentation cannot
be explained away by the obscurity or ambiguity of the language
in the application. Where do we next go?
Statutory Assistance
The first stopping off place should be the state code of the
jurisdiction involved, to learn whether the legislature has seen
fit to give special assistance to the insured. Some of the states
have statutes which restrict the right of the insurer of a liability
carrier to cancel for misrepresentation. Ohio is not one of those
states.
2 Nielsen v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co., 243 Minn. 246, 67 N. W. 2d
457 (1954).
3 13 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 345 (1943).
4 Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Cain, 226 F. Supp. 589 (D. C. Md.
1964).
5 "We should also observe that we are considering an application for in-
surance and an insurance policy which were prepared by plaintiff and
which must be construed against it .... It is well established that con-
ditions which provide for a forfeiture of the interest of the assured, or other
persons claiming under the policy, are to be strictly construed against the
insurance company, and, if there is any ambiguity in a policy which may
reasonably be solved by either one of two constructions, the interpretation
shall be adopted which is the most favorable to the assured . . . ." Farmers
Automobile Inter Insurance Exchange v. Calkins, 39 Cal. App. 2d 390, 393,
103 P. 2d 230, 232 (1940).
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The pertinent section of the Ohio Revised Code which deals
with Casualty and Motor Vehicle Insurance6 deals almost ex-
clusively with rate making. Not one provision of this entire
chapter deals with the rights of an insured in the event of can-
cellation.
There is, however, a most significant section in Chapter 3911,
dealing with Domestic and Foreign Life Companies. It is Ohio
Revised Code § 3911.06 False Answer:
No answer to any interrogatory made by an applicant in his
application for a policy shall bar the right to recover upon
any policy issued thereon, or be used in evidence at any trial
to recover upon such policy, unless it is clearly proved that
it was fraudulently made, that it is material, and that it
induced the company to issue the policy, that but for such
answer the policy would not have been issued, and that the
agent or company had no knowledge of the falsity or fraud
of such answer.
The attempt to apply this section of the code to prevent
cancellation of an auto casualty policy has not been conspicuously
successful. The first rejection occurred in the Court of Appeals
of Scioto County in Republic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wilson7
where the Court held that Section 9391, now Section 3911.06, was
not applicable to an automobile insurance policy, but was appli-
cable only when a suit was brought upon a life insurance policy.
This view was followed by the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga
County a few years later in Burpo v. The Resolute Fire Insurance
Co.8 Most recently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals endorsed
this view in an appeal from a case involving an Ohio assured in
the Western Division of the Northern District of Ohio in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Cook.9
The only opinion contrariwise, also involving an Allstate
policy, is the reported opinion of the Court of Appeals of Allen
County in Spriggs v. Martin.10
Many of the problems and uncertainties of the law in this
jurisdiction would be remedied were the legislature to apply Ohio
Revised Code, § 3911.06, to casualty and automobile insurance
applications.
6 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3937.01-3937.16.
T 66 Ohio App. 522, 35 N. E. 2d 467 (1940).
8 90 Ohio App. 492, 107 N. E. 2d 227 (1951).
9 324 F. 2d 752 (6th Cir. 1963).
10 115 Ohio App. 529, 182 N. E. 2d 20 (1961).
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Breach of Warranty or Misrepresentation
Another section of the Ohio Revised Code, § 3515.01 (d), in
the chapter entitled Life Insurance Policy Provisions, contains
language which would provide great comfort to casualty policy-
holders if extended to coverage other than life insurance. This
subsection provides that:
No policy of life insurance issued or delivered in this state
. . . unless such policy contains: (D) A provision that all
statements made by the insured in the application shall, in
the absence of fraud, be deemed representations and not
warranties.
There is much confusion concerning the distinction between
representations and warranties in insurance litigation. Yet the
ruling of the Court as to whether there is a breach of warranty
or misrepresentation frequently determines the result in this
type of law suit.
A representation is a statement of the insured concerning
a fact or facts which induces the insurer to accept the risk. A
warranty is a stipulation within the policy, on the truth or ful-
fillment of which the validity of the insurance contract depends.
To put it a little differently, a representation is part of the
preliminary proceedings leading to the contract while a warranty
is a part of the completed contract between the insurer and the
insured.'"
If a representation be false, it must concern a material matter
or be made for the purpose of fraud. A warranty need not relate
to a material matter, so that once it is determined that a warranty
is broken, no inquiry will be made by the Court to determine
whether it was significant or trivial, or whether it be made fraud-
ulently or innocently.12
How does this affect answers in an application? On the face
of things, it would seem that those responses are recitations of
facts which induce the carrier to assume the risk. Therefore they
sound like representations. The difficulty normally occurs when
the insurer adopts an answer to a question in the application as
part of the contract, identifying such adopted answer as a con-
dition, covenant, or most frequently, a declaration. Several such
answers may be embraced in the printed contract, the small print
11 Hartford Protection Ins. Co. v. Harmer, 2 Ohio St. 452 (1853).
12 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Pyle, 44 Ohio St. 19, 4 N. E. 465
(1886).
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of the policy reading "in reliance upon which" the carrier makes
its contract with the insured.
Typical of such declaration is one wherein the insured de-
clares that neither the insured nor any resident in his household
has been cancelled or suspended for some number of years prior
to the application date. This makes the safe driving record of the
applicant and his family an integral part of the contract, so that,
assuming it is a warranty, if the insurer shows that one of the
family may be in violation of this declaration, whether material
or not, the contract falls at the option of the insurer.
The successful use of this device makes the lot of the carrier
far less difficult when it chooses to challenge coverage of its
insured. It no longer needs to show that the incorrect answer
in the application was the product of fraud. Materiality need not
be shown. Once it is shown that a declaration has been violated
by the insured, a breach of warranty is charged by the insurer,
which entitles it to void the insurance contract ab initio.
The advantage of this device to the insurer is best exem-
plified by the opinion of Allstate Insurance v. Cook.13 The poli-
cyholder, Cook, had signed an Allstate application in which he
denied that he or any member of his household had ever had a
license suspension or revocation. A 17 year old son had his
license suspended by Juvenile Court for a two month period.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Trial Court's decision in favor of
the carrier, holding that the answer to the question on the appli-
cation was incorporated into a declaration appearing on a supple-
mental page of the policy, "in reliance upon which" Allstate
issued the policy. A warranty was created, according to the
Court, by the language of the policy, which breach justified the
voiding of the policy ab initio.14
Cook is to be contrasted with an earlier decision in Spriggs
v. Martin,15 involving an identical insurance policy. The same
question in the Allstate application was involved, the dispute
arising over whether the applicant, Martin, had been cancelled
by a prior auto carrier. This Court of Appeals of Allen County,
after feebly distinguishing an earlier Court of Appeals opinion in
13 Supra note 9.
14 "An express warranty must be strictly complied with and the insured
is not permitted to allege as an excuse for non-compliance, that the risk is
not affected by the breach thereof since the parties have agreed that the
stipulated facts or acts shall be the basis of the contract." Id. at 754.
15 Supra note 10.
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Burpo v. Resolute Fire Insurance Co.,1" concluded that the
declaration on the supplementary page was a representation and
not a warranty. Though recognizing that Ohio Revised Code
section 3911.06 is in the chapter on life insurance policies, the
Court's opinion revealed that it would in some instances apply
it to casualty policies, and affirmed the trial court's decision
to apply the rule of proof of fraud in Cross v. Ledford 17 before
permitting forfeiture of the policy.
In examining the printed contract of a casualty policy we
see it is solely the creature of the insurer. We have here no
protracted negotiations between two parties, each represented
by counsel, who after extended discussion, turn out a joint work
product re-edited and revised to suit the wishes of both parties.
The insured almost never sees the printed contract until he is
accepted as a risk.
If the insurer has discussed the features of its coverage at
all, either in its advertising or through its agent at the interview,
it has dwelt on the benefits of its coverage to the insured, and
has ignored his obligations. It is pure fiction to say that the
insurer and the insured have bargained for the printed language
appearing in the brochure, which the insured receives and sees
only after being accepted and paying the initial premium, and
it is even more tenuous to maintain that the insured has know-
ingly warranted anything which may be contained in the fine
print of that contract.
The carrier issued the policy because of the preliminary
promise or representations made by the applicant, and for any
misrepresentations made therein by the insured, that insured
should suffer as required by law. But our Courts ought not
allow a representation to be transformed into a warranty by
boiler plate language of a casualty insurer in order to avoid the
burden of proof required in misrepresentation.
It is submitted that whether a promise in an insurance con-
tract is a warranty should be determined less by the language
16 Supra note 8.
17 "In order to maintain an action to rescind a contract on the ground that
it was procured by fraudulent representations, it must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence (1) that there were actual or implied false repre-
sentations of material matters of fact, (2) that such representations were
false, (3) that such representations were made by one party to the other
with knowledge of their falsity, (4) that they were made with intent to mis-
lead a party to rely thereon, and (5) that such party relied on such repre-
sentations with a right to rely thereon." 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N. E. 2d 118
(1954).
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of the contract, especially one prepared and printed only by one
of the contracting parties, than by the intention of both parties
to the agreement. In the absence of any applicable statute, we
submit the following criteria in Volume 7 of Couch, Cyclopoedia
of Insurance Law 305 (2nd ed. 1961) as postulates for consid-
eration by a tribunal faced with this problem.
Whether a statement is a warranty or not depends upon the
intention of the parties which is determined from the lan-
guage employed and the subject matter to which it relates.
In determining this intent, and the consequent existence or
non-existence of a warranty-
(1) the Court will assume that the written words of a
contract conveyed to the minds of the parties thereto
the meaning and effect which have been imputed to
such words by well-established judicial determina-
tions, or by general usage of trade.
(2) the Court will carefully examine every part of the
contract, and construe it as a whole, in order to de-
termine the intention of the parties which, when
ascertained, will govern.
(3) the contract must be construed with reference to the
subject matter and the value of the risk.
(4) the contract must be upheld and given effect if possi-
ble since neither forfeiture nor warranties are favored
by construction.
(5) the contract is entitled to reasonable construction.
(6) Courts will not create, extend or enlarge the contract
obligation by construction, or delete or add words
or clauses.
(7) the language used must be construed in accordance
with its ordinary or popular meaning subject to such
exceptions as and in case of usage, technical terms,
etc.
(8) the written clauses control the printed ones.
(9) the contract should, in case it is open to construction,
be construed strictly against the insurer which formu-
lated it, and liberally in favor of the insured.
Let us now proceed by assuming that we have a misrepresen-
tation, rather than a breach of warranty, which cannot be ex-
plained away by ambiguity or obscurity in the policy.
As indicated in the prior section, unlike a breach of war-
ranty, a misrepresentation per se is not enough to violate the
policy.
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Misrepresentation Leading to Forfeiture
It may be said that in Ohio in order to defeat coverage, the
representation in the alternative must relate to a material matter
or must be made for the purpose of fraud.ls A few jurisdictions
have been reluctant to permit cancellation based on materiality
alone when there was no showing of fraud as well. 19
Because of the difficulty with proving fraud under the Ohio
rule, most attempted cancellations by carriers for misrepresenta-
tion stand or fall on the definition of materialty. The definition
of materialty appearing in 12 Appleman, Insurance Law and
Practice, 398, is deserving of repetition here:
If the representations materially induce the insurer to make
the contract, or would reasonably have influenced the insurer
in its action upon the application, the representation is
deemed material. Some Courts have made the test that if,
whether or not the insurer would have issued the policy
had the true facts been known, or whether, acting in ac-
cordance with the usual practice of insurance companies,
it would have declined to take the risk. Elsewhere it has
been stated that the proper test is whether knowledge of
the risk might reasonably have caused the insurer to de-
cline the risk, and under this rule the question of whether
the insurer would have actually issued the policy under
these circumstances has been held immaterial. Under this
general doctrine the fact that the risk of loss is not actually
increased thereby, or that the loss arose by reason of some
fact other than that which was misstated, has been held
not to alter the result. The most generally accepted test of
materiality is whether the matter misstated could reasonably
be considered material in affecting the insurer's decision as
to whether or not to enter into the contract, and estimating
that degree of character of the risk, or in fixing the premium
rate thereon.
Supposing the insurer makes an independent investigation
of the matters inquired about in the application. This does not
alter the materiality of those responses, and does not lessen the
right of the insurer to rely upon the applicant's representa-
tions.20
18 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Pyle, supra note 12.
19 See the jurisdictions listed in 12 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice,
421 (1943).
20 Merchants Fire Assurance Corp. v. Lattimore, 263 F. 2d 232 (9th Cir.
1959); Reliance Life Insurance Co. v. Sneed, 217 Ala. 669, 117 S. 307 (1928);
7 Couch, Cyclopoedia of Insuance Law 277 (2d ed. 1961).
Sept., 1966
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For purposes of our paper, let us assume we have found a
material misrepresentation in the application for automobile in-
surance under circumstances that would permit forfeiture. Does
this automatically entitle the insurer the right to void the policy?
The answer is in the negative, as the insurer may be pre-
cluded from exercising its right to cancel ab initio because of
waiver or estoppel brought about by the conduct of the insurer
from two sources.
The first is the conduct of its agent at the time the application
was prepared. The second derives from the conduct of its under-
writing department or its claim department in continuing to
permit the policyholder to remain one of its assureds after it
has obtained knowledge of the misrepresentation, choosing to
cancel later only when the coverage of the policy is involved.
Waiver and Estoppel by Conduct of the Agent
We have earlier alluded to the common practice of agents
in completing the answers to the application themselves, either
in or out of the presence of the applicant.
When a misrepresentation occurs in those circumstances,
most Courts estop the insurer from voiding its policy, inasmuch
as the misrepresentation was substantially contributed to by the
agent.
Thus, if the insured correctly states facts to the agent but
the agent fills in improper answers, as a result of mistakes in
recording of the agent,2 1 or when correct answers are given by
the insured, but the agent deliberately records those answers
in a manner not correct,22 the insurer will be held responsible
for the agent's error. The carrier may not avoid responsibility
when the agent prepares the application on his own motion with-
out direction by the insured.23 Also if an applicant uninten-
tionally makes a mistake in his responses, which mistake the
insured's agent is aware of, but the agent fails to state the facts
as he correctly knows them, the carrier is still liable.24
21 Farmers Insurance Co. v. Williams, 39 Ohio St. 584 (1883).
22 Saunders v. Allstate Insurance Co., 168 Ohio St. 55, 151 N. E. 2d 1 (1958);
Emmco Insurance Co. v. Palatine Insurance Co., 263 Wis. 558, 58 N. W. 2d
525 (1953).
23 Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Stark, 120 Ind. 444, 22 N. E. 413 (1889); Ma-
loney v. Maryland Casualty Co., 113 Ark. 174, 167 S. W. 845 (1914).
24 Hartford Protection Insurance Co. v. Harmer, supra note 12.
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On the other hand, if it appears that the false answers were
the product of collusion between the agent and the applicant,
the insurance will be voided, in spite of the knowledge of the
insurer's agent, inasmuch as the absolute lack of good faith by
the policyholder will prevent a Court's allowing him to profit
therefrom. 25
A different result may obtain when the application, though
prepared by the agent, is capable of being read by the insured,
but is not, and is only signed by him. The Ohio rule is that he
is held to have knowledge of the contents of such application. 2
As well, it has been held that he is bound by those answers where
the language of the policy recites that by acceptance of the policy
the insured agrees that the statements in the declaration are his
agreements and representations which he answers as true.27 And
this appears to be true where the policy warrants the truth of
the answers, even though the answers may not have been read
by him and may have been supplied by the agent. 28 These
Ohio Courts of Appeals decisions are difficult to reconcile with
the rationale of the earlier decisions reported in this section. Ap-
parently, all three Courts relied on the policy language, which
recited that the insured, by accepting the policy, warranted that
his earlier answers were true, so that the results in each occurred
because the Court decided there was a breach of warranty rather
than a true misrepresentation.
Other jurisdictions have not been as demanding of the in-
sured in this situation and have not denied recovery where he
has failed to read the application.29
And where the failure of the applicant to read the answers
is brought about by illiteracy or a language barrier, his failure
to read will not preclude his recovery on the policy. 30
25 John Hancock Mut. Life Tns. Co. v. Luzio, 123 Ohio St. 616, 176 N. E.
446 (1931).
26 Republic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wilson, supra note 7.
27 Burpo v. The Resolute Fire Ins. Co., supra note 8.
28 Willig v. Prudential Ins. Co., 71 Ohio App. 255, 49 N. E. 2d 4 (1942).
29 National Life Accident Insurance v. Vaughn, 32 S. 2d 490 (La. App. 1947);
Tarluc v. Fall Creek Farmers Mutual Fire Insurance Agency, 203 Wis. 319,
234 N. W. 364 (1931).
30 Evans v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 322 Pa. 547, 186 A. 133 (1936); Fernan-
dez v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 230 Mo. App. 857, 78 S. W. 2d 526 (1935).
Sept., 1966
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Waiver or Estoppel by Conduct of Employees Other Than Agents
The rationale of authorities in the preceding section is that
where the insurer's agent is aware of some quality in the appli-
cant which might make him undesirable as a risk, yet, in the face
of such knowledge, accepts the risk and facilitates the acceptance
of the applicant by the manner in which he prepares the applica-
tion, the insurer rather than the insured should pay for the
agent's irresponsibility and disloyalty.
There are other areas where the insurer may be held to
have waived its right to forfeiture for misrepresentation, even
though the agent was blameless and the knowledge of the false
statement may not have come to the carrier's attention until a
date well beyond the time of the application. These are three
in number; waiver by reason of the assumption of the investiga-
tion or defense of a claim; waiver by renewal of the policy, and
waiver by retention of premiums. In each instance the act con-
stituting the waiver must be preceded by the insurer's acquiring
the knowledge of the facts which constitute the forfeiture or
breach.
A. Waiver by the Investigation of a Claim or Defense of Suit
An insurance carrier will not waive any defense it may have
under a policy simply by investigating a loss which may have
occurred thereunder. 31 And in a complex investigation, it was
held that an investigation of six to seven weeks after the notice
of accident was received, before a recision was sent to the
policyholder, was not an unreasonable period of time in which
to investigate before deciding to void the policy.32
On the other hand, when the investigation develops a fact
on which the right to forfeit may be claimed, the insurer must
waive the defense if it thereafter proceeds as though the policy
were valid.3 3 The knowledge of several agents may combine to
charge the insurer with a waiver.34
Where the insurer undertakes a defense without knowledge
31 Allstate Insurance Co. v. Moldenhauer, 193 F. 2d 663 (7th Cir. 1952).
32 Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Harris, 216 F. Supp. 420 (E. D. Mo. 1961).
33 American Ins. Co. v. Millican, 26 Ala. App. 31, 153 S. 448 (1933).
34 Smiesters v. Denmark Mut. Home Fire Ins. Co., 177 Wis. 41, 187 N. W. 986
(1922).
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of the facts of the breach of a policy, there is no waiver. 35 But
as above, where the carrier assumes and conducts the defense
with knowledge of facts that will allow forfeiture, without any
reservation of right, it is precluded thereafter to set up a
defense of non-coverage. 3 6
B. Waiver by Renewal
Where the insurer, aware of facts that would justify for-
feiture of a policy, renews a policy, such renewal constitutes a
waiver or estoppel.3 7 Among the few reported cases in this area,
a landmark decision is English v. National Casualty Co.,3 8 where
the Ohio Court permitted recovery by one over the permissible
contract age of 65 when his premium payment had been accepted
by the insurer at renewal time.39
In marked contrast is the recent Federal District opinion in
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Baileys.40 Baileys applied for insurance
from our old friend Allstate in August 1955, answering NO to
the question dealing with prior cancellation or suspension of his
license. The answer was false. Baileys was renewed by Allstate
in August of 1956 and August of 1957. He was involved in an
accident in July of 1957, resulting in death to another. Allstate
knew of the misrepresentation at the time of the renewal in
August, 1957, and did not attempt cancellation until March of
1958 when it proffered a return of premiums.
35 American Casualty Co. of Reading v. Shely, 314 Ky. 80, 234 S. W. 2d 303
(1950); S & E Motor Hire Corp. v. New York Indemnity Co., 235 N. Y. S.
626, 134 Misc. Rep. 514 (1929).
36 Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Blausey, 49 Ohio App. 556, 197 N. E. 385
(1934); Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 45 Ohio L.
Abs. 458, 67 N. E. 2d 836 (1944).
37 29A Am. Jur. 240 (1960).
38 138 Ohio St. 166, 34 N. E. 2d 31 (1941).
39 "The tender of the premium by the insured constituted an offer on his
part to renew the policy for another year and this offer was subject to
acceptance or rejection by the insurer. By the acceptance and retention of
the premium, the insurer exercised that option. It would be inequitable
and unjust to allow it to retain the premium and to delay exercising this
option until injury occurred to the insured and then elect to escape li-
ability under the policy. If no injury had resulted to the insured until
the expiration of the year covered by the premium paid, clearly the in-
sured could not recover the premium on the theory that the policy was
ineffective and void. For the same reason the insurer could not retain the
premium on a gamble that no liability would occur, and then escape li-
ability after an injury occurs by claiming that a condition precedent had
been broken." Id. at 170, 33.
40 192 F. Supp. 597 (N. D. Ohio E. D. 1960).
Sept., 1966
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The Court proceeded to dispose of the last renewal in August
of 1957 by holding that the policy could be cancelled ab initio,
because of the claim record of the insured in the year prior to
that renewal date (presumably the loss in question). This
accident might provide a reason to cancel out the insured in the
future at the option of the carrier, but it is shocking, in the face
of the renewal by Allstate in August of 1957, several weeks
after the notice of the loss was forwarded to the Allstate claims
office, that the occurrence of the loss in one policy period would
provide legal justification for the voiding of the coverage ab
initio in the next policy period as long as the premiums were
proffered back to the policyholder. The knowledge of the loss
received by the claims department before the renewal period is
chargeable to the underwriting department when the renewal
occurs, even though the underwriter may not have had personal
knowledge of that loss.4 1 The logic of the Court in Baileys case
might threaten the coverage retroactively of any insured un-
fortunate enough to be involved in a loss with declarations
similar to those employed by Allstate. Therefore, it is urged that
Baileys is not likely to be accorded much weight as authority,
in view of the violence which it does to the general law, not only
of waiver and estoppel, but the law of casualty insurance
coverage generally.
C. Waiver by Acceptance of Premium
The most frequent instances of post-application waiver or
estoppel occur by reason of the keeping or continued acceptance
of premiums by the insurer after the deemed fraud is discovered.
If it has knowledge which entitles it to terminate the policy
by its own volition, and yet receives and accepts premiums on
the policy thereafter, it is estopped to take advantage of the
forfeiture.42 Thus, if the company accepts premiums after it
knows of an accident and a loss as a consequence thereof, the
agent is precluded from denying coverage, even though there
41 "The general rule, adopted by the overwhelming weight of authority, is
to the effect that any knowledge or information coming to an authorized
representative of the insurer while acting within the proper scope of his
authority is the knowledge of the company. This is necessarily true since
an insurance company is a corporation, and therefore an artificial legal
person, which can have no knowledge of any facts save and except as the
knowledge of its various agents and officers is imparted to it." 16 Appleman,
Insurance Law and Practice, 633 (1944).
42 29A Am. Jur. 250 (1960).
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was a fraud at the time of the accident,43 and a liability insurer
who retains a portion of premiums covering a period of time with-
in which an accident occurs waives its objection to the validity
of a policy based upon facts of which it had knowledge.
44
The compelling reasons for applying waiver where the in-
surer has retained the premiums are set forth in Scarritt Estate
Company v. Casualty Company of America45 and Merchants
Indemnity Corporation v. Eggleston.46
The rationale is stated another way by the Ohio Supreme
Court in English v. National Casualty Co.
47
It is also a well settled rule of law that an insurer, which,
with knowledge of the facts which would entitle it to treat
the policy as no longer in force, receives and accepts a pre-
mium on a policy, is estopped to take advantage of the for-
feiture. The insurer can not treat the policy as void for the
purpose of defense to an action to recover for a loss there-
after occurring, and at the same time treat it as valid for
the purpose of earning and collecting further premiums.
Since waiver and estoppel are equitable remedies available
to one allegedly wronged by the misconduct of another, they
are likely to be applied by a Court only if the supplicant comes
before the Court in cleaner raiment than does the defendant.
Recognizing that, in all the cases, there is a taint of wrongdoing
on the part of the insured at the time of the application, the Court
is apt to look very closely upon the subsequent conduct of the
insured in his relation to the insurer, to be sure the insured has
thereafter dealt in good faith with the insurer.
Therefore, where the policyholder may have been playing
fast and loose with his insurer for some period of time after the
43 Perry v. Campbell, 45 fll. App. 2d 271, 195 N. E. 2d 844 (1963).
44 Goldstein v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York, 10 N. J. Super.
291, 77 A. 2d 51 (1950); Neat v. Miller, 170 Wash. 625, 17 P. 2d 32 (1932);
Royal Indemnity v. Hook, 155 Va. 956, 157 S. E. 414 (1931).
45 "But the rule is well settled that if the insurer or its agent who takes the
insurance knows of the existence of the ground of forfeiture provided in
the policy, and with such knowledge delivers the policy and collects the
premium, the ground of forfeiture is deemed waived. The opposite rule
would enable an insurance company to play fast and loose with its patrons,
to lull them into a feeling of false security by pretending that the insurance
was valid, and when a loss occurred, bringing forth as a defense a ground
of forfeiture that existed from the inception of the contract, and of which
the insurer all along had full knowledge." 166 Mo. App. 567, 570, 149 S. W.
1049, 1050 (1912).
46 37 N. J. 114, 179 A. 2d 505 (1962).
47 Supra, note 38 at 171, 34.
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coverage was commenced, retention of premiums or renewal of
premiums may still not be enough to cause the Court to invoke
waiver or estoppel to prevent voiding of the policy.
Conclusion
Defense against the insurer's effort to void a casualty policy
for misrepresentation, though it may be difficult, is not an im-
possible task. Close scrutiny of the application and contract of
insurance may turn up ambiguity or obscurity that will cast
doubt on the falseness of the representation. The manner in
which the application was taken should undergo minute examina-
tion in order to determine whether the completed document was
the product of the agent rather than of the insured. And it is
vital to learn the date on which the carrier first had awareness
of the facts which it claims were misrepresented, so that one may
know the availability of the defense of waiver and estoppel.
The most confusion, and therefore the most difficulty, arises
when the insurer maintains that the language of the contract
makes the alleged false answer a breach of warranty rather than
a misrepresentation. It is suggested that the desirable solution
is remedial action by the legislature in providing for casualty
policyholders the same protection now afforded to life insurance
policyholders. Forfeiture of automobile liability insurance ought
not to depend on the ingenuity of the attorneys preparing the
small print of any particular insurance contract. Statutory
standards defining forfeiture for misrepresentation should be
created, to apply to all casualty insurers who sell their policies
within the same boundaries.
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